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CARS, CONGRESS, AND CLEAN AIR FOR THE 
NORTHEAST: A SEPARATION OF POWERS 
ANALYSIS OF THE OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION 
Daniel B. Trinkle * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
High concentrations of ozone air pollution in Acadia National Park, 
Maine? Although perhaps difficult to believe and contradictory to the 
notions of pristine wilderness and fresh air that draw visitors to the 
park, it is true.! The reason: Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and 
other densely populated urban centers that generate ozone air pollu-
tion and lie upwind of the park contribute to the air pollution problem 
in Acadia.2 Prevailing airflow currents carry smog caused by auto 
exhaust, utilities, and other air pollution generators from cities and 
industrial areas to Acadia and other northern New England areas.3 A 
typical flow of an ozone plume may start in New York City and travel 
downwind into New England. As the air mass moves northward, it 
continues to accumulate pollutants from other areas along the way 
and the pollutants have more time to react and form ozone.4 By 
afternoon, the plume may extend across central New England, Cape 
Cod, and western Massachusetts. By day's end, the plume will have 
collected pollutants from all across New England as it spreads over 
the rural areas of northern New England.5 
* Executive Editor,1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3435. 
2Id. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
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Congress responded to this growing problem of interstate trans-
port of ozone pollution in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.6 The 
1990 Amendments changed the nation's air pollution laws in a number 
of substantive areas, including the attainment and maintenance of air 
quality standards.7 This Comment focuses on the constitutionality 
of section 184 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,8 a sig-
nificant measure designed to control interstate transport of ozone air 
pollution. 
The Clean Air Act9 ranks among the most comprehensive pieces of 
legislation in our nation's history.lO It is also one of the most complex. 
The Clean Air Act is divided into six subchapters, with parts, sub-
parts, and amendments that present a formidable mountain of statu-
tory language.l1 This Comment only begins to climb the mountain, by 
examining one aspect of a significant development included in the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments: the creation of the Ozone Transport 
Commission (OTC).12 The OTC is a multi-state body granted authority 
by Congress to propose new air pollution control measures for the 
northeastern region of the United States.13 
The issue presented here is whether, as a body created by Congress 
and with duties to recommend rules to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the OTC's formation and authority violate constitu-
tional principles of separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches. Resolution of the issue implicates the Appoint-
ments Clause of the United States Constitution, which specifies the 
procedure for creating federal officers,14 and the nondelegation doc-
trine, which prevents Congress from delegating its authority outside 
the federal government without appropriate guidelines.15 
6 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
7 [d. §§ 101-111, 104 Stat. at 2399-471. 
8 Section 184 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (Supp. V 1993). 
942 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
10 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conser-
vation, 17 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1994). 
11 For instance, the first subchapter alone, entitled "Programs and Activities," contains three 
parts, six subparts, and runs from § 7401 to § 7515, encompassing 198 pages of the most current 
edition of the U.S. Code (Supplement V 1993), not including references to the main edition for 
the text of older provisions still in force. 
1242 U.S.C. §§ 7506a, 7511c (Supp. V 1993). 
13 See id. § 7506a(b)(1). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
15 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989). 
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Section II of this Comment provides an introduction to the Clean 
Air Act and the establishment of the OTC in the 1990 Amendments. 
Section II includes discussion of the OTC recommendations for adop-
tion of low emission vehicle (LEV) standards throughout the N orth-
east that have precipitated increased scrutiny of the Commission's 
authority. Section III addresses the separation of powers doctrine in 
the Appointments Clause and the nondelegation doctrine as devel-
oped through case law, with attention to situations involving regional 
advisory bodies. Section IV critically examines the OTC and assesses 
the OTC's validity in light of separation of powers principles. Finally, 
Section V offers conclusory comments about the need for the OTC 
and its sensible, regional approach to abating interstate air pollution 
that preserves state power to regulate sources of air pollution. 
II. A BACKGROUND OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE 1990 
AMENDMENTS 
A. Introduction to the Clean Air Act 
The general purpose of the Clean Air Act is to protect and enhance 
the quality of the nation's air resources and to encourage the devel-
opment of regional air pollution prevention and control programs.16 
The Clean Air Act combines state and federal legal authority to 
compel states to meet health-based uniform National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for a wide range of common pollutants,17 
including goals for ground-level ozone. IS Since 1970, when national air 
quality standards were established,19 the Clean Air Act has controlled 
levels for such air pollutants as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carb-
on monoxide, lead, and ozone.20 The Act gives each state the legal 
discretion to choose the strategies that the state will employ to meet 
16 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b), (c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The NAAQS for ozone is 0.12 parts per million (235 
g/m3). 50 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1994). The Clean Air Act requires periodic review and, if appropriate, 
revision of the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(c) (1988). The EPA is currently reviewing the NAAQS 
for ozone, which has been reviewed, but not revised, since 1979. See Notice of Review of National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. 5164 (1994). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7512, 7514 (Supp. V 1993). Prior to 1970, federal air pollution legislation 
was aimed at increasing federal research and assistance in preventing air pollution, and relied 
on voluntary state control measures. See Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965); Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 
322 (1955). For a detailed description of the history of the Clean Air Act and its amendments, 
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national air pollution goals, although some measures are federally 
mandated.21 Thus, the Clean Air Act incorporates significant partici-
pation by state pollution control authorities to determine which pol-
lution sources to regulate within state borders, so long as adequate 
measures designed to bring the sum total within federal air pollution 
guidelines are enacted and enforced.22 
Under the Clean Air Act, each state is required to submit an 
individual State Implementation Plan (SIP), setting forth state regu-
lations that provide for implementation, maintenance, and enforce-
ment oflaws and programs that will achieve the NAAQS.23 Addition-
ally, each SIP must provide for adequate control of emissions within 
the state's borders so that emissions generated in one state will not 
cause nonattainment or interfere with air quality programs in neigh-
boring states.24 Under the Clean Air Act, state governors must submit 
to the EPA Administrator a list that designates all areas in their 
states as (i) nonattainment, for those areas that fail to meet NAAQS; 
(ii) attainment, for areas that do meet NAAQS; or (iii) unclassifiable, 
for areas that cannot be classified on the basis of available informa-
tion.25 These designations are subject to EPA confirmation and possi-
ble redesignation.26 
Each state that contains an ozone "nonattainment" area must file a 
revised SIP for EPA approval, explaining the specific control pro-
grams and state laws the state will employ in order to meet the 
federal standards for ozone.27 N onattainment plans must provide for 
the implementation of all reasonably available control measures nec-
essary to bring the state into compliance with the national air quality 
standards.28 For states that fail to revise a deficient SIP in a timely 
manner, the EPA is required to impose sanctions, including loss of 
federal highway funds and an increase of the offset ratio which deter-
mines the stringency of requirements for new sources of air pollu-
tion.29 Additionally, the EPA must adopt a Federal Implementation 
see Arnold Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: Whats Worked; What's Failed; 
What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1581-1612 (1991). 
21 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(c), 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
22Id. § 7410(a). 
2:l Id. 
24 Id. § 741O(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
26Id. § 7407(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
2742 U.S.C. §§ 7410(k)(5), 7502(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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Plan (FIP) governing sources of air pollution in a state that fails to 
submit a timely revised SIP, thus removing from the state the discre-
tion to determine which sources of pollution to regulate.30 
B. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
Congress designed a new program to control the interstate trans-
port of ozone air pollution in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.31 
Stratospheric ozone, found eighteen to thirty miles above the Earth, 
serves as a protective shield from the sun's ultraviolet rays.32 Ground-
level ozone, however, is dangerous to human health, and is a primary 
target of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.33 Ground-level ozone, 
a major component of smog, forms when nitrogen oxides from auto-
mobile emissions and other internal combustion engines combine with 
volatile organic compounds in heat and sunlight.34 Each year ground-
level ozone is responsible for several billion dollars worth of loss from 
crop yield, as well as noticeable damage to foliage in many crops and 
trees.35 The health effects of inhaled ozone include chest pains, short-
ness of breath, coughing, nausea, throat irritation, and increased sus-
ceptibility to respiratory infections.36 Long-term chronic exposure to 
summertime ozone concentrations may lead to biochemical and struc-
tural changes in the lungs and accelerated aging of the lungs analo-
gous to that caused by smoking cigarettes.37 
:30 See § 741O(c). 
~1 Id. § 7511c; S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 48-51 (1989), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3420, 3434-37. 
32 Environmental Protection Agency Final Rule on Ozone Transport Commission; Low Emis-
sion Vehicle Program for the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712 n.l 
(1995)[hereinafter EPA Final Rule](to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52 and 85). 
33Id. For a description of the impacts of ozone air pollution on health and vegetation, see 
Henry A. Waxman et aI., Roadmap to Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: 
Bringing Blue Skies Back to America's Cities, 21 ENVTL. L. 1843, 1851-53 (1991). 
34 EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4712. For a detailed explanation ofthe chemical processes 
involved in forming ozone and a discussion connecting current science on tropospheric ozone 
pollution with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, see Paul J. Miller, Cutting Through the 
Smog: The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and a New Direction Towards Reducing Ozone 
Pollution, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 124, 125-38, 158-63 (1993). 
85 EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4712-13; see also Waxman, supra note 33, at 1852. 
36 EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4712. 
87 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3392. 
Additionally, the EPA reports that repeated ozone exposure can cause permanent structural 
damage in the lungs of animals as well, and can accelerate the rate of lung function loss and the 
lung aging period. EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4712-13. 
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Due to atmospheric conditions, an ozone plume may travel many 
miles, thus affecting the attainment status of areas that do not gen-
erate the pollution.38 Recognizing the need for regional cooperation to 
control the interstate transport of ozone air pollution, Congress es-
tablished the Northeast Ozone Transport Region (NOTR) in the 1990 
Amendments.39 The region is comprised of states in the Northeast 
Corridor, including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont, as well as the Consolidated Metropolitan 
Statistical Area that includes the District of Columbia.40 States may 
opt out of the NOTR by satisfying a two-part analysis that considers 
wind patterns to determine the impact of that area's emissions on 
downwind areas, as well as vehicle migration from the state or part 
of a state seeking to opt out to another area in the NOTR.41 
The 1990 Amendments permit the creation of additional interstate 
transport regions 
[w]henever, on the Administrator's own motion or by petition 
from the Governor of any State, the Administrator has reason to 
believe that the interstate transport of air pollutants from one or 
more States contributes significantly to a violation of a [NAAQS] 
in one or more other States .... 42 
Congress further required the formation of an Ozone Transport 
Commission for the NOTR, consisting of: 
(A) The Governor of each State in the region or the designee of 
each such Governor. 
(B) The [EPA] Administrator or the Administrator's designee. 
(C) The Regional Administrator (or the Administrator's designee) 
for each Regional Office for each Environmental Protection 
Agency Region affected by the transport region concerned. 
HS See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3435. Data for the summer of 1988, for example, listed high ozone levels (above the NAAQS of 
0.12 parts per million (ppm» in such areas as Stafford, Conn. (0.238 ppm), Bridgeport, Conn. 
(0.217 ppm), Cape Cod National Seashore, Mass. (0.18 ppm), Bennington, Vt. (0.125 ppm), 
Whiteface Mountain, N.Y. (0.135 ppm), Acadia National Park, Me. (0.202 ppm), Portland, Me. 
(0.168 ppm), Quabbin Reservoir, Mass. (0.21 ppm), and Rye, N.H. (0.184 ppm). New York City 
(0.206 ppm) and other Mid-Atlantic areas, such as Newark, N.J. (0.218 ppm) and Camden, N.J. 
(0.195 ppm) collect ozone from their neighbors to the south. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3436. 
H!J See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a). 
40 I d. Because the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area includes significant portions of 
Virginia, that state is also represented on the OTC. See Daniel P. Jones, EPA Accepts Regional 
Plan to Require Cleaner-Burning Cars, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 15, 1994, at B1l. 
41 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.5, at 274 (June 2, 1995). 
4242 U.S.C. § 7506a(a). 
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(D) An air pollution control official representing each State in the 
region, appointed by the Governor.43 
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The OTC's job is "to assess the degree of interstate transport of 
[ozone]" and to "assess strategies for mitigating ... interstate pollu-
tion" in the NOTR.44 The OTC then reports to the EPA Administrator 
its recommendations necessary to ensure that SIPs meet the 
NAAQS.45 The OTC may also recommend additional control measures 
that it determines are necessary to bring any area in the region, or 
selected parts of the region, into attainment.46 OTC recommendations 
may be made to the EPA only by a majority vote of the governors on 
the OTC or their designeesY 
The EPA has a statutory obligation to decide on the OTC recom-
mendations within nine months, with the option to approve or disap-
prove the recommendations, wholly or in part.48 If the OTC recom-
mendations are disapproved, the EPA must explain why the 
additional control measures proposed by the OTC are not necessary 
to bring an area in the region into ozone attainment, and specify 
recommendations for equal or more effective actions that could be 
taken.49 If the EPA approves the OTC's plan, however, each state in 
the transport region is required to include the approved additional 
measures in its SIp'50 Upon approval or partial approval of OTC 
recommendations, the EPA Administrator must issue a "SIP call," 
which requires the areas affected by the plan to revise their SIPs to 
include the control measures recommended by the OTC.51 
Though the OTC is a creation of Congress, the legislative history 
of the Clean Air Act reveals that state air quality directors in the 
Northeast had been cooperating for several years.52 Lack of authority 
to institute regional air pollution controls and lack of support from the 
EPA prevented these regional efforts from being more successful, 
although some meaningful control measures were promulgated.53 In 
48 [d. § 7506a(b)(1). 
44 [d. § 7506a(b)(2). 
45 [d. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(I). 
47 [d. 
48 [d. § 7511c(c)(4). 
49 [d. 
50 [d. § 7511c(c)(5). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(I). 
52 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3437. 
53 [d. In 1987, state environmental commissioners from states in the Northeast States for 
Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
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1988, the EPA organized the Regional Ozone Transport Group 
(ROTG) to provide for discussion among federal and state environ-
mental officials regarding interstate pollution transport in the N orth-
east.54 Spurred by state representatives from Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the ROTG set forth 
in a policy statement strong support for a regional ozone strategy, 
recognizing that national, regional, and local control measures are 
needed for the abatement of ozone pollution.55 
C. The Ozone Transport Commission Petition 
In its first major action under the Clean Air Act, in February, 1994, 
the OTC issued recommendations for pollution control measures that 
would apply throughout the entire NOTR.56 The OTC voted nine to 
four to urge the EPA to adopt the OTC recommendation requiring 
that, beginning in Model Year 1999, only cars meeting the stringent 
Low Emissions Vehicle (LEV) standards be sold and registered in the 
OTR.57 Under the LEV standards, new vehicles would be required to 
be equipped with progressively cleaner-burning engines, which could 
add up to $130 to the cost of a new car.58 The plan further requires 
that two percent of the vehicles marketed in a state must be zero 
emissions electric cars.59 On January 24, 1995, the EPA published its 
decision to approve the OTC recommendation for LEV standards.60 
The OTC member states had previously signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding individually pledging to adopt the LEV standards.6! 
Many of the bills submitted to state legislatures died, however, due 
to intense pressure from auto industry lobbyists.62 After two states-
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding agreeing to propose similar gasoline volatility regulations. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3435,3437. By 1990 seven states had enacted regulations to limit gasoline volatility. Id. at 3437. 
54 Id. 
55Id. 
56 See 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1731 (Feb. 4,1994). 
57 Id.; Vicki Allen, Northeastern States Get Tough on Pollution, CHI. 'TRIB., Feb. 6, 1994, 
(Transportation), at 3. 
58 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1651 (Dec. 23,1994); Daniel P. Jones, EPA Accepts Regional 
Plan to Require Cleaner-Burning Cars, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 15, 1994, at B1l. 
59 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1651 (Dec. 23, 1994). 
60 EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712 (1995). 
61 Proposed Rulemaking on Ozone Transport Commission; Emission Vehicle Program for the 
Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 59 Fed. Reg. 21,723 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) 
(proposed Apr. 26, 1994). 
62 James C. McKinley, EPA Seeks Emissions Agreementjor Northeast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
1994, at Bl. 
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Massachusetts and New York-adopted the LEV standards, the 
automobile industry promptly filed lawsuits in each state.63 Although 
both suits failed to remove the LEV standards in those states, the 
litigation and lobbying efforts have caused some states to wait until 
a significant number of other states pass similar legislation before 
adopting their own proposals.64 As of September, 1995, only three 
states-New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut-have adopted 
rules mandating the emission standards proposed by the OTC.65 
In some states there is internal opposition to the LEV standards 
and even resistance to membership in the OTC.66 In Pennsylvania, for 
example, the legislature passed a resolution opposing the OTC's LEV 
standards, even though the Pennsylvania representative on the OTC 
voted in favor of the OTC recommendation.67 In March, 1995, the state 
of Virginia filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia for review of the final EPA rule requiring LEV standards.68 
The most vigorous opposition to the OTC recommendation, how-
ever, comes from the automobile industry. The American Automobile 
Manufacturers Association and the Association of International Auto-
mobile Manufacturers, two groups that together represent virtually 
all of the firms worldwide that manufacture automobiles for the 
United States market, claim that the relationship between the OTC 
and the EPA violates constitutional principles of federalism and sepa-
ration of powers embodied in the Appointments Clause and the non-
delegation doctrine.69 
In a show of support for the EPA, five northeastern states have 
filed to intervene and join in defending the EPA decision to implement 
fi3 See American Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep't 
of Envtl. Protection, 31 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1994); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States 
v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994). 
fi4James C. McKinley, EPA Seeks Emissions Agreement/or Northeast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
1994, at B1. 
6625 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2498 (Apr. 21, 1995). 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
68 Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, No.95--1163 (U.S. 
App. D.C. filed Mar. 14, 1995). 
69 Letter from Kenneth Starr, counsel on behalf of the American Automobile Manufacturers 
Association and the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, to Walter Dellin-
ger, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice 5 (July 20, 1994) [here-
inafter Starr Letter leon file with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of the Attorney 
General, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108). The automobile industry groups have joined 
Virginia in the lawsuit appealing the EPA LEV rules. See Commonwealth of Virginia v. United 
States Envtl. Protection Agency, No. 95-1163 (U.S. App. D.C. filed Mar. 14, 1995). 
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LEV standards within the NOTR.70 The move pits Massachusetts, 
New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont against Virginia 
and the auto industry. 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
As the United States Supreme Court has noted many times, the 
separation of government powers into three distinct branches is es-
sential to the preservation of liberty.71 Each branch must remain 
"entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the others."72 The separation of powers scheme seeks to 
protect against the gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same branch.73 Accordingly, the Supreme Court will strike down pro-
visions that permit the exercise by one branch of powers that are 
more appropriately diffused among several branches or that under-
mine the authority or independence of another branch.74 Where there 
is no threat of aggrandizement or encroachment, however, statutory 
provisions that involve sharing or commingling functions have been 
upheld.75 
The separation of powers doctrine does not require a hermetic 
division between the branches.76 Rather, the doctrine is intended to 
achieve a system of checks and balances and coordination among 
branches, with "separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity."77 Thus, overlapping responsibilities among branches im-
poses duties of independence and interdependence and allows a flex-
ible, workable government.78 
70 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2501 (Apr. 21, 1995). 
71 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); see, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654,685-96 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986). 
72 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
73 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (Congress may not control execution of laws 
except through Article I procedures of bicameralism and presentment). 
74 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382; see, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34 (Congress may not encroach 
on authority of Executive Branch by exercising removal power over officer performing Execu-
tive Branch functions); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (invalidating legislative veto provision). 
75 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382, 397 (upholding congressional creation and placement of 
Sentencing Commission in judicial branch); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-73 (upholding statute 
providing for judicial appointment of independent counsel). 
76 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380-81. 
77 [d. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)(Jack-
son, J., concurring»; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-13 (1974)(affirming a flexible 
approach to separation of powers analysis). 
78 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381. 
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The separation of powers doctrine generally imposes two con-
straints on Congress: Congress may not, either directly or indirectly 
through its agents, exercise executive power;79 and Congress may not, 
either directly or indirectly or through its agents, exercise legislative 
power without complying with the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment.80 
A. The Appointments Clause 
Although separation of powers principles among the three branches 
of government are generally inherent in the structure of the Consti-
tution, the Appointments Clause specifically provides for separation 
between Congress and the Executive Branch.81 The primary role of 
the Appointments Clause is to ensure that Executive power remains 
independent and free from congressional encroachment.82 The Ap-
pointments Clause provides: 
[The President], by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate ... shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.83 
Congress may establish federal agencies, while the President ap-
points federal officers to serve in those agencies.84 As the only affir-
mative power vested in the President in the domestic realm, the 
Appointments Clause serves as a check upon legislative authority in 
order to avoid an undue concentration of power in Congress.85 As the 
Supreme Court has confirmed, Congress may not control the law 
79 Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991)[hereinafter CAAN);see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
80 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 274-75; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
HI See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
H2 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-23 (1976); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)(separation of powers inquiry focuses "on the extent to which 
[a statute] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions"). 
>l3 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
84 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879). 
85 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-9, at 244 (2d ed. 1988). 
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enforcement process by appointing an individual who will execute 
its laws.86 
The Constitution sets forth two distinct classes of officers: the 
principal class, which requires nomination by the President and 
confirmation by the Senate; and "inferior officers," who are account-
able to principal officers, and whose appointment Congress may vest 
in the President, in the courts oflaw, or in the heads of departments.87 
All persons holding a federal government office were intended to be 
included in the Appointments Clause and appointed in one of the two 
methods that the provision specifies.88 
The Supreme Court set forth a three-part Appointments Clause 
test in Buckley v. Valeo: the Appointments Clause applies to (1) all 
executive or administrative officers, (2) who serve pursuant to federal 
law, and (3) who exercise significant authority over federal govern-
ment actions.89 Any appointee to whom these three factors apply must 
be selected by the President or by a department head answerable to 
the President.90 Individuals who are merely employees of the United 
States government do not trigger the Appointments Clause.91 The key 
is that Congress may not appoint members of any agency that exer-
cises executive powers.92 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court sustained on separation of powers 
grounds a constitutional challenge to various provisions of the 1974 
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA).93 The statute established a Federal Election Commission 
86 Springer v. Government of the Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202-03 (1928)(invalidating 
statute that authorized three-person committee consisting of two legislators and one executive 
to perform executive functions). 
87 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509-10. 
HH [d. The distinction between "principal" and "inferior" officers can play an important role in 
Appointments Clause analyses. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988). The distinc-
tion is significant insofar as it demands that some officials ("principal" officers) may only be 
appointed by the President together with the Senate. As for "inferior" officers, the Appoint-
ments Clause is more permissive, allowing either the President alone, the judiciary, or the heads 
of departments to make appointments. In neither case, however, is Congress permitted to 
appoint officers of the United States. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976). 
89 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power and 
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 
(1987) [hereinafter Seattle Master Builders]. 
90 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
91 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. 
92 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33 (finding Comptroller General an agent of Congress, so congres-
sional delegation of authority to Comptroller General to revise the federal budget was imper-
missible exercise of executive power); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139-41. 
98 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6, 126. 
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and vested in the Commission the primary responsibility for admin-
istering and enforcing the FECA.94 The Commission's powers in-
cluded making rules for carrying out FECA's provisions, bringing 
actions against violators, and authorizing convention expenditures in 
excess of FECA's specified limits.95 Before a rule promulgated by the 
Commission could take effect, FECA required that the rule be pre-
sented either to the Senate or the House of Representatives together 
with a detailed explanation of the proposed rule.96 If the house to 
which the rule was presented disapproved the proposed regulation 
within the period of time specified under FECA, the rule could not be 
promulgated by the Commission.97 
Although two members of the Federal Election Commission were 
selected by the President, with confirmation by both Houses of Con-
gress, the remaining four voting members were appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and by the Speaker of the 
House.98 Thus, the problem in Buckley was that if Congress wanted 
the Commission to exercise those powers conferred on the Commis-
sion, then the Commission's members constituted "Officers of the 
United States," and had to be appointed according to the Appoint-
ments Clause. If Congress instead wished to retain the power to 
appoint the Commission's members, then the Commission could 
not undertake those functions that are not properly performed by 
Congress.99 
The Supreme Court held that the procedure for appointing mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission by congressional leaders 
violated the constitutional directive that the President, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint all "Officers of the United 
94 [d. at 109. 
95 [d. at 109-12. 
96 [d. at 140 n.176. 
97 [d. 
98 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
99 [d. at 118-19. Likewise, Bowsher v. Synar involved a delegation of authority to the Comp-
troller General to revise the federal budget. Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1986). After 
concluding that the Comptroller was an agent of Congress, the Supreme Court held that he 
could not exercise Executive branch powers: "To permit the execution of the laws to be vested 
in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control 
over the execution of the laws." [d. at 726. Characterizing the Comptroller's action as legislative 
does not solve the constitutional problem, because Congress may not delegate the power to 
legislate to its own agents. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). "If Congress were free to 
delegate its policy-making authority to one of its components, or to one of its agents, it would 
be able to evade 'the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.'" Bowsher, 478 
U.S. at 755 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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States."IOO Thus, under Buckley, "any appointee exercising significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of 
the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed" by the Presi-
dent.101 Stated another way, if an agent is not appointed by either the 
President, the head of an Executive Branch department, or a court of 
law, he is not considered an "officer" for Appointments Clause pur-
poses, and therefore may not exercise powers of a duly appointed 
"officer."102 
Buckley limits application of the Appointments Clause to individu-
als who perform their duties "pursuant to the laws of the United 
States."I03 Where appointees are selected by Congress and empow-
ered to carry out their duties by federal statute, receive federal 
salaries, or are otherwise beholden to Congress, they are serving 
pursuant to federal law and the Appointments Clause is implicated. 104 
Under the second prong of the Buckley test, the Appointments 
Clause does not apply where members of a regional body perform 
their duties pursuant to state law, rather than federal law. 105 In Seattle 
Master Builders Association v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Planning Council, a group of home builders filed a 
petition to strike down on Appointments Clause grounds a regional 
policy-making council (Council) created and designed by Congress in 
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation 
Act.I06 Composed of members appointed by the governors of each 
member state and supported by legislation in each state authorizing 
100 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126-27. 
101 [d. at 126. 
102 [d.; see United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) ("Unless a person in the service 
of the Government ... holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one 
of the courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, 
he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States"); United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 
525, 532 (1888) ("An officer of the United States can only be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by a court of law, or the head of a department. A 
person in the service of the government who does not derive his position from one of these 
sources is not an officer of the United States in the sense of the Constitution."). 
108 424 U.S. at 126. 
104 See id. at 109-13 (executive duties performed by standing body with members appointed 
by Congress and drawing federal salary); see also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) 
(person whose position is without tenure, duration, or continuing emolument not subject to 
Appointments Clause); U.S. ex reI. Truong v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 623 (C.D. Cal. 
1989) (no violation of Appointments Clause where qui tam plaintiff not appointed by Congress, 
receives no federal salary, and has no responsibility for enforcing federal statute). 
105 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 
(1987). 
106 [d. at 1362. 
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the appointment of Council members, the Act directed the Council to 
provide a regional plan for implementing conservation measures to an 
agency of the United States Department of Energy.107 In upholding 
the constitutionality of the Council, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit found dispositive the fact that the Council 
members performed their duties pursuant to an interstate compact, 
rather than federal law. !Os The court emphasized that the Council 
members' appointments, salaries, and direction were made pursuant 
to the laws of the four individual member states, and that "[ w ]ithout 
substantive state legislation, there would be no Council and no Coun-
cil members to appoint."109 There was no threat of Congress arrogat-
ing to itself powers that are to be exercised by the President because 
Congress could neither appoint nor remove members of the Council.l1O 
The court stressed that "congressional consent did not result in 
the creation but only authorized the creation of the compact organi-
zation and the appointment of its officials."lll As the product of an 
interstate compact, the Council was immune to Appointments Clause 
scrutiny. 112 
The third prong of the Buckley test, whether or not a congressional 
agent is exercising significant authority over federal government ac-
tions, depends on the agent's specific powers.113 Although there is no 
bright-line test, authority or influence over federal government action 
becomes "significant" when Congress concentrates power in one 
branch or undermines the authority of another branch.114 Where Con-
gress creates a regional body to perform investigative and informa-
tive functions, or to make recommendations that are not binding, 
there is no conflict with the Appointments Clause.115 Congress violates 
separation of powers principles, however, by investing authority in a 
107 [d. 
108 [d. at 1365. 
109 [d. 
110 Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. Since the Council did not serve pursuant to 
federal law, the court found it immaterial whether the Council exercised significant executive 
authority over federal activity, or whether the Council's duties were classified as executive or 
legislative. [d. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. 
113 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-43 (1976). 
114 See id. at 122; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1988). 
115 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137; see Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Brennan, 958 F.2d 930, 937 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
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regional body to issue rules or promulgate regulations, or by exerting 
effective control over federal decisions.U6 
Congressionally constructed regional bodies that merely propose 
rules, but lack the power to promulgate them, do not rise to the level 
of exercising "significant" federal authority. In Northwest Environ-
mental Defense Center (NEDC) v. Evans, for example, the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon validated a regional 
body because it was not vested with the power to implement rules.l17 
At issue was the Pacific Fishery Management Council (Fishery Coun-
cil), a regional advisory body established by Congress in the Mag-
nuson Act.Hs The Fishery Council consisted of thirteen voting mem-
bers: eight appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, one regional 
director of the National Marine Fisheries Service, and four members 
appointed by the governors of the states of California, Idaho, Oregon, 
and Washington.H9 
The purpose of the Fishery Council was to prepare a fishery man-
agement plan for the federal fishery conservation zone, an area in the 
Pacific Ocean extending nearly 200 miles from the three-mile coastal 
zone.120 The statute charged the Fishery Council with proposing regu-
lations for the plan's implementation and making reports and recom-
mendations to the Secretary of Commerce.121 Among other things, the 
Fishery Council's management plan would determine the allowable 
catch of coho salmon for commercial and recreational fishermen. l22 
Under the Magnuson Act, the Fishery Council was required to 
submit its plan to the Secretary of Commerce for review to determine 
whether the plan was consistent with the national standard.123 If the 
Fishery Council's plan was approved, the Secretary of Commerce 
would then promulgate regulations to implement the plan, which 
116 See CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 276-77 (1991) (holding unconstitutional regional board created 
and controlled by Congress that exercises effective control over management of federal airport); 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (holding unconstitutional Congress's retention of 
power to remove Comptroller General, as impermissible authority over execution of federal 
law); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (once Congress enacts legislation, its participation 
ends, and it can only affect the execution of its laws indirectly by passing new legislation). 
117 Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. (NEDC) v. Evans, No. 87-229-FR, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8977 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 1988), at *15--20. 
118 [d. at *3. 
119 [d. at *2. 
120 [d. 
121 Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 at *3. 
122 [d. at *2. 
123 [d. at *3. 
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operates to prevent overfishing while achieving the maximum possi-
ble yield from each fishery.124 If the Secretary were to fail to notify 
the Fishery Council in writing of his disapproval of the plan within 
ninety-five days, the proposed fishery management plan would auto-
matically take effect.125 
The plaintiffs in NEDC v. Evans claimed that the Fishery Council 
was a federal agency and thus was barred under the Appointments 
Clause from having its members appointed by state governors.126 The 
provision under which the Fishery Council's plan automatically takes 
effect unless disapproved in writing within ninety-five days, the plain-
tiffs maintained, effectively allows the Fishery Council to promulgate 
regulations; the Secretary of Commerce, the plaintiffs argued, acted 
only as a "straw man."127 The court disagreed, however, finding that 
only the Secretary of Commerce had the power to promulgate regu-
lations, and that no fishery management plan could be implemented 
without being acted upon by the Secretary of Commerce.128 Although 
the Magnuson Act required the Secretary of Commerce to take action 
to disapprove the Fishery Council's proposed plan within ninety-five 
days, under the statute only the Secretary of Commerce had the 
power to promulgate regulations.129 The court announced the rule that 
"[s]ignificant authority over federal government actions comes from 
the ability to promulgate, not propose, implementing regulations 
.... "130 The Fishery Council was valid because it "[did] not exercise 
significant authority over federal government actions," and thus did 
not meet the third element of the Buckley test.131 
Similarly, Congress acts within its legal boundaries by appointing 
officers that are subject to removal by a higher executive official.I32 In 
Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court considered a separation of 
powers challenge to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics 
124 [d. 
125 [d. at *19. 
126 Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 at *17. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. at *19; see NEDC v. Brennan, 958 F.2d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming that Fishery 
Council is valid because it only proposed fishery regulations, which were then implemented by 
the Secretary of Commerce after review). 
129 [d. at *19. 
130 [d. at *20. 
131 [d. 
132 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988); Silver v. U.S. Postal Service, 951 F.2d 
1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding constitutional appointment of Postmaster General by gover-
nors of Postal Service who act as head of department). 
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in Government Act of 1978.133 That statute created a "Special Divi-
sion" of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit that had the authority to appoint an independent counsel 
and to define the counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction.l34 In finding that 
the Special Division was valid, the Court explained that the congres-
sional grant of power "does not include any authority to formulate 
policy for the Government or the Executive Branch," and that with 
respect to policy matters, the special prosecutor must comply with 
the policies of the Department of Justice.l35 Thus, because Congress 
retained no control or supervision over the counsel, there was no 
danger of Congress encroaching on or undermining the powers of the 
Executive Branch.136 There, the dispositive point was the fact that the 
statute still afforded the Executive Branch sufficient control to enable 
the President to perform his constitutional duties.137 
Recent separation of powers decisions, however, have constrained 
Congress from expanding its influence into the Executive Branch.138 
Where a congressionally appointed body has coercive influence over 
federal decisionmaking, or where Congress retains control over a 
body to which Congress has granted executive authority to issue 
rules, Congress has encroached too far. 139 For instance, in Metropoli-
tan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, Inc. (CAAN), the Supreme Court invalidated a stat-
ute that transferred authority over National and Dulles Airports to 
a regional Board of Review.140 The statute stipulated that the Board 
be composed entirely of members of Congress, chosen from a list 
furnished by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President pro tempore of the Senate.141 The list system required ap-
pointments to the Board of Review to be chosen from members of 
133 487 u.s. at 660--61. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 671-72. 
136 See id. 
137 [d. at 685-93. 
138 See, e.g., CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 269 (1991); Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 
36 F.3d 97, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1995)(No. 
94-925). 
139 See CAAN, 501 U.S. at 269; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (Congress may 
not retain removal power over officer performing executive functions); Confederated Tribes of 
Siletz Indians v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479,1489 (D. Or. 1994) (Congress may not grant 
state governor veto power over discretionary decision made by agency of Executive branch). 
140 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 255, 277. 
141 [d. at 259. 
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congressional committees charged with authority over air transpor-
tation, and there was no requirement that the list contain more rec-
ommendations than the number of Board openings.142 The list provi-
sion guaranteed Congress effective control over the appointment and 
removal of Board members.143 Significantly, the statute also gave the 
Board of Review power to veto decisions made by the Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Authority (MWAA or Airports Authority), the 
entity that operates the two airports.144 Actions that had to be sub-
mitted for Board approval included adoption of a budget, authoriza-
tion of bonds, promUlgation of regulations, endorsement of a master 
plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the MWAA.145 
The Supreme Court struck down the congressional scheme as an 
impermissible extension of legislative power beyond the constitution-
ally confined role.146 That the Board of Review was established by the 
by-laws of the MWAA, which was created by legislation enacted by 
the State of Virginia and the District of Columbia, "[was] not enough 
to immunize it from separation-of-powers review."147 At the core of 
its ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Board of Review 
was "an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers 
of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is to protect 
an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is re-
stricted to congressional officials."148 If the Board's power was execu-
tive, then an agent of Congress could not exercise it; if the Board's 
power was legislative, then Congress had to exercise it in conform-
ity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the 
Constitution.149 
As the Court observed, the congressional scheme at issue in CAAN 
provided a model for extensive congressional expansion.150 If the 
Board of Review were valid, the Court declared, "Congress could ... 
use similar expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain 
control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of 
state grant recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect 
142Id. at 268-69. 
148Id. 
144Id. at 260-61. 
145 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 260. 
146 I d. at 276. 
147 I d. at 266. 
148 Id. at 269. 
149 Id. at 276. 
150 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 277. 
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of national policy."151 Thus, when Congress retains too much control 
over one of its agents exercising executive authority-as with con-
gressional review or veto provisions-Congress has violated the sepa-
ration of powers set forth in the Constitution.152 
An amended version of the same statute at issue in CAAN ap-
peared in Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Author-
ity.153 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit invalidated the statutory arrangement on the 
grounds that Congress still exercised signficant authority over the 
function of the Airports Authority via the Board of Review.l54 Al-
though Congress eliminated the Board's veto power, Board members 
remained congressionally dominated, and the amended statute actu-
ally expanded the Board's powers in a number of other ways.155 Criti-
cal to the court's determination that the Board exercised federal 
power was the Board's potential impact on the decisionmaking of the 
Airports Authority.156 
The court objected to the Board's power under two main provisions 
of the amendments that (1) allowed the Board to decide whether 
action by the Authority would be taken immediately, or be delayed 
and subjected to a sixty-day review by Congress;157 and (2) permitted 
the Board to request the Airports Authority to consider and vote on 
any matter related to the two airports, and to do so "as promptly as 
feasible."158 Thus, the Board could force any issue onto the Authority's 
agenda for priority consideration.159 This agenda-setting power, com-
bined with the Board's power to determine which Authority actions 
could be implemented immediately and which could be delayed for 
congressional review, permitted the Board to compel the Authority 
to "trim their sails to accommodate the [Board's] wishes."160 The fact 
that the Authority was running airports exacerbated the problem 
because decisions such as adopting a budget, letting contracts, and 
issuing bonds are time-sensitive, and delay could result in the loss of 
151Id. 
152 See id.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1986). 
15'> 36 F.3d 97, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1995) (No. 
94-925). 
154 Id. 
155Id. at 99. 
15.i Id. at 102. 
157Id. at 99. 
1GB Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 99. 
159 I d. at 102. 
16oId. at 105. 
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millions of dollars.161 Thus, the arrangement pressured the Authority 
to avoid crossing the Board and incurring delay.162 
The Hechinger court noted that Congress may exert enormous 
influence over agency decisions through its ability to "advise, coordi-
nate, and even directly influence an executive agency ... through 
oversight hearings, appropriation and authorization legislation, or 
direct communication with the [agency]."163 The court warned, how-
ever, that "[a]dvice ... surely implies influence, and Congress must 
limit the exercise of its influence, whether in the form of advice or not, 
to its legislative role."I64 The determinative factor for the court was 
that the amended statute maintained a structural relationship be-
tween Congress, through the Board, and the Authority that went 
beyond persuasion to coercion.165 The Board of Review's delay power 
effectively forced the Authority to tailor decisions to the Board's 
pleasure, and gave the Board power to suspend an important Author-
ity decision in order to compel the Authority to agree to an unrelated 
matter.166 This arrangement, the court held, was an encroachment 
beyond the legislative sphere because the Board could impermissibly 
interfere with the Authority's performance of its independent respon-
sibilities.167 Ultimately, the Authority was left with two options: it 
could "either bow to the will of the Board of Review, or risk the time 
and uncertainty of congressional action."168 Far more than merely 
"advisory," the Board of Review had the power to coerce the Author-
ity into adopting any "recommendation" that the Board might make.169 
161 Id. at 104. 
162 Id. 
163 Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 104. 
164 Id. at 102. 
165 Id. at 104; see Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 997 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (Comptroller General's ability to stay the award of contracts under a federal statute 
upheld because "any potential disruption of the executive function [was] minimal"); Lear Siegler, 
Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 1988) ("proper inquiry is not 
whether a legislative agent can temporarily 'bind' or 'directly affect' parties outside the legis-
lative branch, but rather whether the legislative agent exercises control or ultimate authority 
in the disposition of a particular issue"). Unlike Ameron and Lear, Hechinger stressed that the 
statute at issue did not allow the Authority to override the Board of Review's power to delay, 
a safeguard vital to upholding the stay provisions in both Ameron and Lear. Hechinger, 36 F.3d 
at 103. 
166 Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 105. 
167 Id. at 104. 
168 [d. at 105. 
169 [d. 
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As this line of cases illustrates, failure to meet anyone of the three 
prongs in Buckley clears a congressional agent from Appointments 
Clause scrutiny.170 Courts look both to the overall relationship of the 
agent to Congress and to the agent's impact or potential impact on 
federal lawmaking in applying the Appointments Clause. l7l To deter-
mine when a congressional agent exercises significant authority over 
federal actions, courts examine the degree of legislative expansion 
and disruption of the functions of another branch.172 
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
Apart from the constraint in the Appointments Clause against 
Congress's usurping the power given to the Executive Branch, sepa-
ration of powers principles also require that when exercising legisla-
tive power, Congress must follow the "single, finely wrought and 
exhaustively considered, procedure" specified in Article I of the Con-
stitution.173 The broad theory underlying the limitation on congres-
sional capacity to delegate authority is "that every act taken under 
color of federal authority, whether undertaken by Congress itself or 
by one of its agents, must be meaningfully traceable to a specific 
exercise of constitutionally granted legislative or executive power."174 
Thus, the primary limitation of the nondelegation doctrine is that 
Congress may not delegate its law-making authority unless it has 
conformed with the bicameralism and presentment requirements in 
the Constitution.175 
Courts approach the nondelegation doctrine with a practical under-
standing that in our complex society, Congress cannot perform its 
function without the ability to delegate power under broad direc-
tives.176 It is sufficient, therefore, for Congress to state a general 
170 See NEDC v. Evans, No. 87-229-FR, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977, at *19 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 
1988); Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 
(1987). 
171 See CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 266-70 (1991); Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 100-05; Seattle Master 
Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. 
172 See CAAN, 501 U.S. at 276-77; Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 102-04. 
m INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 758-59 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("when Congress legislates, when it makes binding policy, it must follow 
the procedures prescribed in Article I ... enactment by both Houses and presentment to the 
President"). 
174 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17, at 364 (2d ed. 1988). 
175 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 274; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
176 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
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policy, the public agency which is to apply the policy, and the limits of 
the delegated authority.177 
As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo, Congress may, 
under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause,17s create ge-
neric offices and even provide methods for appointment to those 
offices.179 The operating premise is that any constitutional grant of 
power implies the power to delegate authority sufficient to effect 
the grant's purposes.lSO Any "Officers" who serve in congressionally 
created offices or agencies, however, must be appointed in conform-
ity with the Appointments Clause. lSI Officers created outside the Ap-
pointments Clause may only perform duties in keeping with "those 
functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an area 
sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of the 
public law as to permit their being performed by persons not 'Officers 
of the United States."'lS2 In other words, Congress cannot delegate 
authority to execute laws, because such a delegation requires author-
ity that Congress does not possess.lS3 
The determinative factor for nondelegation doctrine purposes is 
that when Congress delegates its authority, Congress must provide 
intelligible principles to guide those exercising the delegated author-
ity.ls4 In Mistretta v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court 
examined the statute in which Congress created the United States 
Sentencing Commission, placed the Commission in the Judicial 
Branch, and delegated authority to the Commission to issue sentenc-
ing guidelines binding on federal courts.lS5 The Court held that Con-
gress did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, because Congress 
set forth specific policies and principles to govern the formulation of 
177 [d. at 372-73. 
178 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof." 
179 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976). 
180 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948). 
181 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138-39. 
182 [d. at 139. 
183 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
184 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1988); see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) (holding congressional delegation of power must be 
accompanied by "standards oflegal obligation"); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 
(1935) (holding congressional delegation must include provisions laying down policies and estab-
lishing standards to guide the selected instrumentality). 
185 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 362-69. 
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the sentencing guidelines.186 Although Congress delegated significant 
discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analyses, 
Congress easily satisfied the intelligible principle standard by stating 
in the statute specific goals, purposes, and factors for the Commission 
to consider in its formulation of offense categories.187 As the Court 
explained: 
[0 ]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the 
guidance of the [delegatee's] action, so that it would be impossible 
in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress 
has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of 
means for effecting its declared purpose. l S8 
On this standard, the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States 
upheld a delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity 
prices with the mere statutory guidance that he exercise "his judg-
ment" to ensure that prices are "generally fair and equitable and will 
effectuate the purposes of [the statute]."189 As our modern adminis-
trative state suggests, the Supreme Court has regularly upheld Con-
gress's ability to delegate power under broad standards.190 The exist-
ence of intelligible standards governing the actions of the agent 
exercising delegated authority satisfies the nondelegation doctrine.191 
Having properly delegated its authority with guiding priciples, how-
ever, Congress remains subject to the general separation of powers 
constraint that Congress not retain improper control over the agent 
exercising the delegated executive authority.192 
In sum, the Constitution imposes upon Congress two fundamental 
constraints on the exercise of its power.193 Under the Appointments 
Clause, Congress may not appoint officials that exercise executive 
186 [d. at 379. 
187 [d. at 374-75. 
188 [d. at 379 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944)). 
189 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 420. 
190 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; see, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 
(1946) (upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent 
unfair distribution of voting power among securities holders); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426 (upholding 
delegation to Price Administrator in his judgment to set fair commodity prices and further 
purposes of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 
600 (1944) (validating delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine fair rates). 
191 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; J.w. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928). 
192 CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 275-77 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726--27 (1986). 
19;1 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 274. 
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functions. 194 Additionally, the nondelegation doctrine prevents Con-
gress from delegating its authority to make laws without providing 
adequate guidelines.195 Through these two constraints, the separation 
of powers doctrine aims to forestall the danger of congressional en-
croachment beyond its constitutional role at the expense of another 
branch.196 
IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE OTC UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS 
PRINCIPLES 
Applying the overarching principle that Congress may not unduly 
concentrate power in itself or extend its power into the realm of 
another branch, the OTC would likely withstand separation of powers 
scrutiny. Although the OTC arrangement may begin to approach the 
limit of congressional action, Congress has not usurped significant 
power from the Executive Branch nor prevented the Executive 
Branch from performing its function. Because the OTC falls outside 
the scope of the Appointments Clause, and Congress did not imper-
missibly delegate authority to the OTC, the OTC should pass consti-
tutional muster. 
Following the Buckley test, the Appointments Clause would not 
likely operate to invalidate the OTC.197 For the Appointments Clause 
to apply, all three factors in the Buckley test must be met.198 As a body 
derived from a combination of federal and state power, and with no 
executive functions, the OTC should fall outside the scope of the 
Appointments Clause. 
The members of the OTC should not be considered "officers of the 
United States" under the Appointments Clause.199 Since the OTC was 
not appointed by the President, the head of a department, or a court 
of law, the members of the OTC cannot be considered "officers."200 
194 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
195 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373. 
196 CAAN, 501 U.S at 274; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129 ("[T]he debates of the Constitutional 
Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative 
Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two 
branches"). 
197 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123-27. 
19R [d. at 126; Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1059 (1987). 
199 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
200 See id. 
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Even more, it does not appear that the OTC members are ultimately 
appointed by Congress. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments estab-
lished the OTC and its offices, but indicated that the OTC positions 
be filled by the governors of the individual states in the NOTR or 
their designees, regional EPA officials, and state air pollution control 
officials.201 Since both the state governors and the state air pollution 
control officials serve pursuant to internal elective and appointive 
processes within the NOTR states, it is the states, not Congress, who 
fill the positions on the OTC. 
This state involvement clearly distinguishes the situation at hand 
from Buckley, where four members of the Federal Election Commis-
sion were directly selected by the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.202 Neither has 
Congress significantly limited the pool of potential members who may 
serve on the OTC, as was the case with the congressional control over 
appointment under the list system in CAAN.203 Congress has given 
state governors power to decide whether to sit on the OTC them-
selves or to designate OTC members.204 Moreover, it is entirely con-
ceivable that a state may decline to participate in the OTC by failing 
to send delegates to sit on the OTC.205 It would be difficult to find, 
therefore, that the OTC members hold an office under the federal 
government.206 
The second prong of the Buckley test further suggests that mem-
bers of the OTC are not "officers," and not subject to the Appoint-
ments Clause, since the OTC does not serve "pursuant to the laws of 
the United States."207 Admittedly, Congress established the OTC by 
statute and defined the members' duties and responsibilities.208 Con-
gressional creation of a regional body does not, however, lead to the 
conclusion that officers of that body serve pursuant to federallaw.209 
Like the Council members in Seattle Master Builders,2l0 the OTC 
201 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(1). 
202 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
208 See CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1991). 
204 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(1). 
205 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments make no provision for failure to participate in the 
OTC arrangement. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506a, 7511c. 
206 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
207 See id.; Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1059 (1987). 
20H 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506a(b), 7511c. 
209 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. 
210 [d. 
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members are appointed by the governors of each member state and 
charged by statute with devising a regional plan to be submitted to 
an Executive Branch agency. Dispositive in Seattle Master Builders, 
however, was the fact that the Council members' appointments and 
salaries were state-derived.211 Therefore, the Council in that case was 
immune from Appointments Clause scrutiny because the Council's 
members did not serve "pursuant to federal law."212 Likewise, OTC 
members are state officials and gubernatorial designees and are paid 
by their respective states. State governors may choose to sit on the 
OTC, or the governor may select a designee-regardless, Congress 
has not made appointments to the OTC, but merely shifted the ap-
pointment decision to state governors, who are responsible to their 
respective electorates. Although Congress created the positions that 
comprise the OTC, the final decision as to who fills those positions lies 
with the states and the balance of power between Congress and the 
Executive Branch thereby remains unaffected. 
The instant situation is not as clearly defined as Seattle Master 
Builders, which involved an interstate compact, an element not pre-
sent with respect to the OTC.213 Nonetheless, the operative premise 
of Seattle Master Builders based on state participation applies to the 
OTC: without state-level action by the members of the NOTR, there 
would be no OTC.214 State officials are the only members who may 
exercise effective power on the OTC, because recommendations, such 
as the LEV standards proposed by the OTC, can only be made upon 
a majority vote of the sitting governors or their designees on the 
OTC.215 Additionally, the NOTR states have conferred authority on 
their state officials to participate on interstate agencies, such as the 
OTC,216 and state legislatures are free to direct how their air pollution 
officials should vote. The fact that OTC members are accountable to 
their respective states confirms that the OTC operates pursuant to 
state law, not federal law. 
211 [d. 
212 [d. 
213 See id. Interstate compacts involve reciprocal state legislation, congressional approval, and 
formation of a regional body by the states, not by Congress. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. 
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985). 
214 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. 
215 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(1). 
216 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-171(5) (1985) (state Department of Environmental Pro-
tection Commissioner shall "advise and consult with agencies of the United States, agencies of 
the state, political subdivisions and industries and any other affected groups [regarding air 
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The issue of the degree of authority the OTC exercises over federal 
actions would likely form the heart of a court's separation of powers 
analysis. Under this third Buckley prong, the OTC is likely to stand 
valid because the OTC has no power to implement or promulgate 
rules.217 Thus, the OTC does not perform executive functions. Even if 
a court were to find that the OTC does exert influence over EPA 
decisions, the OTC still may be valid, because Congress does not 
retain control or supervision over the OTC.218 
As a body with no effective power to enforce or implement its plans, 
the OTC merely offers proposals to the EPA, and therefore does not 
exercise executive or administrative power.219 The OTC's statutory 
role is to propose to the EPA "recommendations" for measures the 
OTC determines are necessary to meet NAAQS.220 Such recommen-
dations are not binding on the EPA, which may approve or reject, in 
full or in part, any OTC proposal.221 The OTC thus possesses none of 
the veto power over executive decisions given to the Board of Review 
in CAAN.222 The OTC arrangement more closely resembles that pre-
sented in Evans, a decision that validated a regional Fishery Manage-
ment Council on the grounds that "[s]ignificant authority over federal 
government actions comes from the ability to promulgate, not pro-
pose, implementing regulations."223 Like the Fishery Council in 
pollution control]"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(c)(5) (1974) (state air pollution officials have 
power to "effectuate state policy by providing for ... [a] program for cooperating with federal, 
interstate, state, local governmental agencies and utilities in the development and utilization of 
... air resources"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-C:6(V) (1990) (state environmental officials 
powers include "[a]dvising, consulting, and cooperating with the cities and towns and other 
agencies of the state, federal government, interstate agencies, and other affected agencies or 
groups in matters relating to air quality"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-9(f) (West 1994) (Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection has power to "cooperate with ... the Federal Government, 
the State Government, or any county or municipal government or ... private sources for the 
study and control of air pollution"); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4004(24) (1993) (Department of 
Environmental Resources shall "[c]ooperate with the appropriate agencies of the United States 
or of other states or any interstate agencies with respect to the control, prevention, abatement 
and reduction of air pollution"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-23-5 (1989) (state Director of Environ-
mental Management shall have power "[t]o advise, consult, and cooperate with the cities and 
towns and other agencies of the state, federal government, and other states and interstate 
agencies"). 
217 See NEDC v. Evans, No. 87-229-FR, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977, at *20 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 
1988). 
218 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
219 See Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 at *20. 
220 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(2). 
221 [d. § 7511c(c)(4). 
222 See CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1991). 
223 Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977, at *20. 
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Evans, which was comprised in part of gubernatorial appointees from 
member states and which proposed regulations and made reports and 
recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce,224 the OTC may 
recommend additional control measures to the EPA, which ultimately 
has the power to implement rules.225 The Clean Air Act does not 
require the OTC to issue any recommendations for additional control 
measures, nor does the Clean Air Act permit an additional recommen-
dation to become a federal rule unless acted upon by the EPA, even 
if the EPA takes longer than the statutory limit of nine months to 
decide on an OTC proposal.226 Such provisions imply even less power 
to promulgate rules than was present in Evans, where the Magnuson 
Act required the Fishery Council to submit a plan to the Secretary 
of Commerce, and stated that if the Council's fishery plan was not 
acted upon within ninety-five days, the plan would automatically take 
effect.227 The OTC's function is arguably more than merely investiga-
tive or informative, since the OTC offers proposals which, if accepted, 
require the EPA to declare current SIPs deficient and the NOTR 
states to incorporate the new measures into their SIPs.228 Under the 
reasoning of Evans, however, the OTC's inability to promulgate rules 
is highly indicative of a lack of authority over federal actions.229 
The OTC may nevertheless be struck down if, short of actually 
implementing rules, the OTC has a coercive influence over the EPNs 
action.230 The OTC has the power to determine additional control 
measures for EPA consideration.231 In addition, the EPA may only 
reject an OTC recommendation if the EPA can show that the measure 
is not necessary to bring any area into attainment or is otherwise 
inconsistent with the Clean Air Act.232 If the EPA disapproves an OTC 
recommendation, the EPA must suggest equal or more effective ac-
tions that could be taken by the OTC.233 A court could reasonably find 
from these requirements that the OTC has the ability to set an agenda 
224 [d. at *2-3. 
225 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(4). 
226 See id. In fact, the EPA took approximately eleven months to rule on the OTC proposal. 
See EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712, 4715 (1995). 
227 Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977, at *17. 
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(5). 
229 See Evans, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977, at *20. 
230 See Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 
1994), eert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1995) (No. 94-925). 
231 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(1). 
232 [d. § 7511c(c)(4)(i). 
233 [d. § 7511c(c)(4)(ii). 
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for the EPA.2M Even though the EPA is not confined to consideration 
of only OTC recommendations, the OTC has greater influence because 
the EPA would have to evaluate an OTC plan and construct an equal 
or better alternative before it could disapprove an OTC proposal.235 
The criteria for EPA review of OTC proposals make approval easier 
than disapproval. 
The OTC's agenda-setting influence is less than that displayed in 
H echinger, where the Board of Review had the power to review 
time-sensitive Airports Authority decisions and subject them to the 
delay of congressional review.236 The OTC has no effective means at 
its disposal to exert pressure over the EPA's decision, such as review 
of EPA decisions or delay tactics.237 Unlike the Board of Review in 
Hechinger, the OTC cannot delay an EPA decision by subjecting it to 
congressional review.238 Congress did make it more difficult for the 
EPA to disapprove an OTC recommendation by selecting somewhat 
narrow criteria for EPA review, requiring EPA to show that OTC 
recommendations are not necessary within all or part of the NOTR.239 
This requirement falls far short, however, of the coercive power of the 
Board of Review in Hechinger, which could compel the Airports 
Authority to follow Board policy through veto and delay powers.240 
The OTC recommendations at issue are not particularly time-sensi-
tive, and showing that an OTC recommendation is not necessary to 
bring an area into attainment does not force the EPA to "trim its 
sails" to accommodate OTC wishes, as was true in Hechinger.2Al The 
fact that the EPA received the OTC recommendation for the LEV 
program in February, 1994, yet spent until January, 1995, to decide-
two months longer than the statutory nine months specified for the 
review process-indicates that the EPA proceeded independently on 
its own timetable.2A2 
Congress has given the OTC something more than advisory power, 
but it is unlikely that a court would find that the OTC's influence on 
the EPA amounts to coercion, or that Congress has reserved effective 
234 See Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 102. 
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(4). 
236 See Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 104-05. 
237 See id. at 102-03, 105. 
238 See id. 
239 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(4)(i). 
240 36 F.3d at 104-05. 
241 See id. at 105. 
242 EPA Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712, 4715 (1995). 
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control over the OTC.243 As opposed to the congressionally dominated 
Board of Review wielding executive power in CAAN, membership in 
the OTC is not limited to a list of Congressmen, and Congress has 
neither appointment nor removal power over OTC members.244 Con-
gress can only assert control over the OTC by eliminating the OTC 
and its offices altogether in subsequent legislation. This ability may 
afford Congress some persuasive effect over the OTC, but it falls 
short of the congressional dominance and extension beyond the legis-
lative sphere found in CAAN.245 Most significantly, whatever influence 
the OTC may have over the EPA, it does not significantly impede 
the EPA from performing its independent function.246 The EPA may 
adopt or reject any OTC recommendation, and the EPA, not the OTC, 
has the power to implement rules. It is unlikely, therefore, that a court 
would find an impermissible encroachment into the Executive Branch 
sphere. 
Although there is room for a court to find that the OTC exercises 
some degree of influence over the EPA, it is not likely to prove 
significant. Moreover, the connection between Congress and the OTC 
is sufficiently remote to permit OTC members to act independent of 
congressional control. Established by Congress, but with members 
appointed by the states, no power to promulgate rules, and little 
effective power to coerce the EPA, the OTC fails to meet the criteria 
set forth in Buckley and therefore falls outside the scope of the 
Appointments Clause.247 
Given the deference that modern courts grant to Congress, allow-
ing substantial leeway to delegate its power under broad principles, 
it is further unlikely that a court would employ the nondelegation 
doctrine to strike down the OTC.248 Under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of the Constitution,249 Congress has properly distanced the 
OTC from administration or enforcement of public law, while permit-
ting the OTC to aid in Congress's legislative function.250 As a regional 
243 See Hechinger, 36 F.3d at 104-05. 
244 CAAN, 501 U.S. 252, 268 (1991). 
245 See id. at 269-70. 
246 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382-83 (1989). 
247 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
248 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. But see Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (criticizing judicial unwillingness to scrutinize 
congressional delegations of authority). 
249 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
250 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138-39. 
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body that studies interstate ozone pollution and proposes mitigation 
strategies to the EPA, the OTC exercises no power that Congress 
could not exercise itself.251 If the OTC is considered to be empowered 
with legislative authority, following the principle underlying the non-
delegation doctrine, Congress has correctly set forth intelligible prin-
ciples to guide the OTC in its operation.252 The Clean Air Act states 
that the OTC shall "assess the degree of interstate transport of the 
pollutant or precursors to the pollutant throughout the transport 
region, assess strategies for mitigating the interstate pollution, and 
recommend to the [EPA] such measures as the Commission deter-
mines to be necessary" to meet the NAAQS.253 Thus, if the OTC 
exercises legislative power, Congress has provided intelligible stand-
ards for guidance.254 The OTC guidelines are more replete than those 
upheld as valid in Yakus v. United States, which left much more 
discretion to the Price Administrator to act "in his judgment" to 
attain fairness and equity.255 Far from being overly vague, the nar-
rowly tailored provisions for EPA review further suggest that Con-
gress has provided adequate guidelines and has not unconstitutionally 
transferred federal authority to the OTC.256 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under the ultimate concern of the separation of powers doctrine, 
the OTC should be valid because it does not usurp the function of the 
EPA or unduly concentrate power in Congress. The OTC does not 
offend the Constitution's separation and balance of powers among the 
branches under either the Appointments Clause or the nondelegation 
doctrine. As an innovative creation springing from both state and 
federal power, the OTC allows for regional state cooperation without 
impermissibly extending the arm of Congress outside its constitution-
ally confined role. In the end, the OTC may have the effect of expand-
ing the power of the states, but it does not impermissibly aggrandize 
congressional power. 
That the OTC and the EPA's implementation of the OTC's LEV 
standards are valid comports not only with constitutional law, but also 
251 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
252 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73. 
25:1 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(2). 
254 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
255 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
256 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511c(c)(2),(4). 
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with common sense. It does not make sense for our country to address 
pollution problems only on a local, county-by-county, or state-by-state 
level. Ozone air pollution does not obey state boundaries. Combating 
ozone air pollution requires regional, potentially even national, coop-
eration. Devising solutions to ozone pollution problems on individual 
state bases fails to combat the problems caused by interstate trans-
port of ozone and forces downwind states to shoulder the burden for 
their upwind neighbors. As the situation in the Northeast has proven, 
states have been unable to work together to enact significant recip-
rocal air pollution abatement plans throughout the region. Congress 
needed to aid the process. The OTC-recommended LEV standards 
are an important part of northeastern states' plans to meet the re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act. 
Admittedly, Congress could have mandated the LEV program on 
its own. The difficulty in establishing such standards, however, de-
rives from two factors. First, the political process, with powerful and 
wealthy interest groups such as the automobile industry, can stall 
legislation or prevent laws that target automobiles as sources of air 
pollution. Second, Congress does not possess the technical knowledge 
or resources to gather and assess information about ozone air pollu-
tion. It therefore makes sense for Congress to remove the issue to a 
body with more expertise. With its state and federal air pollution 
officials, the OTC is much better equipped to gather and assess inter-
state air pollution in a timely fashion. Furthermore, to place the 
determination of regional control measures in the hands of a regional 
body comprised of state representatives preserves the basic structure 
of the Clean Air Act. The EPA could have imposed the LEV stand-
ards unilaterally, without the OTC, but state participation on the OTC 
allows states to have a voice in meeting national goals. 
